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Spatial differences in income per capita motivate much of growth theory and development
economics. While income differences across countries and across regions within some coun-
tries have been documented extensively, there is little systematic evidence on how interregional
income differences (within countries) compare and relate to inequality across countries. The
relative magnitudes of cross-country, cross-municipality, and within-municipahty differences are
important for at least two related reasons. First, they shed light on the extent to which sources
of major economic differences in income and productivity are national, local, and idiosyncratic
in nature, documenting patterns that comprehensive explanations of growth and development
should strive to match. Second, they signal the possible presence of important interlinkages
between local and national determinants of productivity, which would necessitate a unified the-
oretical framework for analysis.
This paper documents the magnitudes of cross-country, cross-municipality, and within-
municipahty inequality in labor incomes and household expenditure for the Americas (Canada,
Latin America, and the United States), a large geographic region containing almost one billion
people and around 30% of global GDP. Our contribution is twofold. First, we document sub-
stantial within-country (and cross-municipality) differences in output and standards of living
for a large number of countries. For example, among eleven Latin American countries for which
we have municipality level data, the between-municipality differences in individual labor income
are about twice the size of between-country differences (when the United States is included, this
ratio is reversed). About half of both between-country and between-municipahty differences are
explained by observed human capital, the remainder being due to "residual" factors. Disparities
in physical capital across regions are unhkely to be the primary factor explaining these differ-
ences, because of the relatively free mobility of capital within national boundaries. Therefore,
similar to the residual in cross-country exercises, these regional residual differences can be at
least partially ascribed to differences in the efficiency of production across sub-national units.
The dominant empirical approach for understanding differences in income per capita starts
with the neoclassical (Solow) growth model. The neoclassical framework explains growth and
output levels by human capital, physical capital and technology. Since technology is exogenous
in the neoclassical model, the emphasis in empirical studies starting with this model is often
on the dynamics of the capital stock. Our view is that, given the mobihty of physical capital
inside national boundaries, the neoclassical model offers limited insight into efficiency differences
across regions within countries. Thus, the second contribution of our paper is to take a first
step towards developing a unified theoretical framework for the analysis of cross-country and
within-country differences. Our framework emphasizes the importance of local differences in
the efficiency of production, likely shaped by institutions (defined as the rules determining
how collective decisions are made). More specifically, within countries, productive efficiency
is determined, amongst other things, by local institutions. Local institutions influence how
local and regional collective decisions are made, how lower levels of government interact with
the national government, and how political power is distributed at the local level. ^ Through
• Examples of national institutions include the structures imposed by the national constitution and laws.
these channels, local institutions impact important determinants of the efficiency of production,
such as the provision of local public goods and the security of local property rights. At the
country level, productive efficiency is determined by the average of local institutions, by national
institutions, and by the technology adoption and use decisions of profit-maximizing firms. A
country where local institutions in several regions create inefficiencies will exhibit not only
within-country differences, but also lower national income. Aggregate output is lowered directly,
due to the presence of these low income regions, and indirectly, because low demand from poorer
regions will lead to a smaller market size for new technologies, discouraging technology adoption
at the national level.
It is sometimes (explicitly or implicitly) assumed that even though institutional differences
may be important for understanding cross-country differences in economic outcomes, they do
not play a major role in explaining interregional differences (e.g., Guido Tabellini (2006)). This
view is predicated on the notion that institutions are national and cannot explain within-country
differences. However, both de jure and de facto institutions vary greatly within countries. In
countries with federal systems, such as Mexico and Brazil, states have considerable authority in
changing laws and de jure institutions, and de facto institutions—e.g., the degree of enforcement
of national laws, the extent to which local and regional elections are free and fair, the degree
of de facto control by local elites, and the functioning of the judiciary—often vary substantially
within national boundaries.^ Moreover, national institutions and policies may have differential
effects in different regions (e.g., a tariff policy promoting industrial development will likely affect
urban and rural areas differently).
As preliminary evidence on the importance of local public goods and institutions, we docu-
ment large disparities in access to paved roads—a specific and important public good—within
countries in the Americas. We show that differences in access to paved roads are highly cor-
related with individual incomes (after controlling for various geographic and other observable
factors). Finally, we also discuss several existing empirical studies that connect public goods
and economic prosperity to specific local institutions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss existing
approaches to cross-country and cross-regional income differences. Section 2 describes the micro
data sets we use for investigating within-country differences. Section 3 provides various decom-
positions of cross-country and within-country differences in the Americas. Section 4 summarizes
evidence on the extent of within-country differences in institutional quality and availability of
public goods. Section 5 introduces our theoretical framework, and Section 6 concludes. The
online appendix contains additional details on data sources and further results.
E.xamples of local institution.s include the degree to which regional and local election.s are free and fair, the de
facto control of some regions by local economic and political elites and organized criminals, and in federal systems,
stiite constitutions that may give regional !awmaker.s substantial powers to determine local laws and pohcies.
"See. among others, Edward L Gib.son (2005) and Guillermo O'Donnell (1993). See also Daron Acemoglu and
James A. Robinson (2008) for a model of de jure and de facto institutional differences, with a discussion of the
importance of de facto institutional differences in the development of the US South.
1 Approaches to Cross-Country and Cross-Region Differences
The dominant empirical approach for examining differences in income and growth rates between
countries, and between regions within countries, begins with the neoclassical (Solow) growth
model. As is well known, the neoclassical model has no theory of technology differences and a
minimal theory of differences in human capital. Much of its focus is on the dynamics of physical
capital. At the cross-country level, N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer and David N. Weil (1992)
have argued in a seminal contribution that the neoclassical growth model provides a good account
for cross-country differences in income per capita without significant technology differences. In
another prominent series of contributions, Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1995) suggest
that convergence across OECD countries, convergence across US regions, and cross-country
growth dynamics can be understood through the closed-economy neoclassical growth model.
While influential, this emphasis on physical and human capital has been called into question
by, amongst others, Peter J. Klenow and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Robert E. Hall
and Charles I. Jones (1999). These authors document that, with reasonable assumptions on
aggregate production functions, large technology differences are necessary to account for the
significant cross-country differences in income per capita and output per worker, and to account
for growth dynamics. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the closed-economy neoclassical growth
model could provide an informative framework for understanding within-country differences,
given the absence of barriers to physical capital mobility within countries.
After documenting the large within-country differences in the Americas, we develop a theoret-
ical framework emphasizing (broadly construed) technology differences at both the cross-country
and cross-municipality levels. Our approach emphasizes the following potential determinants of
income per capita in national and local economies:
1. Technological know-how will potentially vary at the national level, thus influencing cross-
national income differences.
2. Efficiency of production will vary both at the national and the subnational levels. We
emphasize variation due to institutions (i.e., enforcement of property rights, entry barriers,
and freeness and fairness of elections for varying levels of government) and the implied policy
outcomes (i.e., the availability of public goods necessary for production and market transactions).
Our framework is sufficiently flexible that it can also be used to think about non-institutional
determinants of local productivity, some of which are discussed in Section 4.
3. Human capital of the workforce will differ both across countries and within countries, in
part because of differences in institutions and policies that affect access to schooling and the
costs and benefits of acquiring a marginal unit of education.
In this theoretical framework, national factors, in particular, national institutions and their
impact on technology adoption, influence local outcomes, while, in turn, local institutions affect
not only local outcomes but also the overall demand for new technologies and the rate at which
they are adopted at the national level.
This framework motivates (and is motivated by) our empirics in Section 3. We start with
micro data on individual earnings from 17 countries in the Americas. Micro data enable us
to decompose labor income inequality into between-country and within-country components
and provide us with a simple methodology for separating the effect of human capital from
other factors by controlling for individual-level education and experience. This exercise enables
a preliminary decomposition of municipality-level economic differences between those due to
education (proxying for factors embedded in workers) and those related to the locality itself.
Our work is related to a large literature on spatial inequality, most of which is focused on
variation in incomes within a single country. Notably, for the United States, Antonio Ciccone
and Hall (1996) estimate that doubling county employment density (county labor input divided
by county landmass area) increases average labor productivity by 6 percent. This estimated
degree of locally increasing returns would account for more than half of the variation in labor
productivity across US states. In light of this evidence, Section 4 provides a preliminary upper
bound estimate of the role of density in explaining spatial inequality in the Americas. Another
set of relevant contributions are collected in Ravi Kanbur and Anthony J. Venables (2005), which
in particular includes two studies for Latin America: Chris Elbers et. al combine non-income
census data and household survey data on income for Ecuador to produce a measure of well-
being, finding that across-census tract inequality in well-being explains around 25% of inequality
in well-being within Ecuador, and Javier Escobal and Maximo Torero use household expenditure
data to investigate the determinants of spatial inequality in Peru, estimating a predominant role
for variation in private and public assets, such as roads.
Several studies examine within-country inequality among various countries. Most notably,
Leondardo Gasparini (2004) and Juan Luis Londoho and Miguel Szekely (2000) document the
extent of income inequality over time within a large number of Latin American countries and
provide cross-country comparisons.'^ Several features distinguish our paper from these previ-
ous studies on Latin American inequality. Through our use of population censuses and living
standards measurement surveys, we have access to larger samples and higher-quality labor in-
come estimates than the existing literature, which tends to use lower quality sources in order to
produce an income panel. Thus, we are able to provide a more systematic and accurate snap-
shot of inequality patterns. We also confirm our findings using carefully constructed household
expenditure data, which are more reliable than labor income data for several countries in our
sample because a high fraction of the population works in the informal sector. Finally, we are
not aware of other studies conducting comparative decompositions of within municipality and
cross-municipality inequality into human capital-related and residual components.
^
2 Data
We use data on labor income, geo-referenced to the municipality, for 11 countries in the Amer-
icas (see Appendix Table Al for the list of countries). We also examine labor income data
geo-referenced at the regional level for an additional six countries. Our data are drawn from a
There is also a literature on inequality acro.ss versus within countries at the global level. While interesting and
important, due to severe data limitations this literature makes a large number of assumptions when constructing
within-country income."? from highly aggregative data.
number of recent censuses and living standards measurement surveys, all conducted since 2000.
A list of sources is provided in Appendix Table Al. We limit our attention to labor income, which
is typicall)' better reported than total income.^ Our sample includes all individuals with positive
incomes, and for some calculations we limit the sample to males between the ages of 18 and 55 to
reduce selection based on labor force participation. To increase comparability across countries,
we adjust each country's income data so that it averages to GDP per worker in constant inter-
national dollars, taken from the 2003 Penn World Tables. Population weights are constructed
using 2000 GIS population data (Center for International Earth Science Information Network,
2004). Summary statistics are provided in Appendix Table A2.
Our baseline results do not deflate incomes for differences in regional purchasing power.
Differences in costs of living are important for comparisons of living standards across regions, but
given our focus on productivity differences (rather than welfare), nationally-deflated incomes are
more informative. We nonetheless confirm the robustness of our general conclusions to deflating
incomes using the state median of a household-specific Paasche index constructed from a number
of household expenditure surveys.
To examine variation in local public goods, we use geospatial data on intercity roads compiled
by the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT, 2008a), supplemented with more
recent (2006) data on road infrastructure from the Earth Science Research Institute (Mexico)
and the Peruvian Ministry of Transport (Peru). These data identify the geographic location of
roads as well as their surface type (paved, gravel, or dirt).
3 Within-Country and Between-Country Differences
In this section, we perform two exercises. First, we decompose inequality in labor income into
three components: inequality between countries, inequality between municipalities or regions
(within countries), and inequality within municipalities/regions. Second, we decompose labor
income inequality at each level of geographic aggregation into two components: that explained
by observable human capital variables and the residual.
As is well known, the set of additively decomposable inequality indices corresponds to the
General Entropy class of measures. We focus on two commonly used measures within the General
Entropy class: the Mean Log Deviation (MLD) index and the Theil index. The MLD index of
overall inequality in the Americas is:
J Mj Ljrn
MLD = lny-
-Y,Y.J2^nyjrm (1)
J = l 771=1 7=1
where y-,mi is the labor income of individual i in municipahty m in country j, j/ is mean labor
income in the Americas, and L is total population in the Americas.^ Similarly, the Theil index
"For Latin America, the data provide information on monthly labor income, .so for these countries there may
be greater tran.sitory variability than annual labor income numbers for the United States and Canada.
^Since our focus is on labor income inequality, we would have preferred to weight the data by the size of the
of overall inequality in the Americas is:
j=l m=l i=l ^ \ f /
Let us further define j/jm as mean labor income in municipality va in country j, L_,>„ as the
number of individuals in municipality m in country j, t/j as mean labor income in country j,
and Z/j as the number of individuals in country j. Then the MLD and Theil indices can be
decomposed into our three desired components of inequality as follows (see the Appendix):
MLD= Wy-Y.^\r.y\ + ;^ ^ H Iny, - f^^ lny,„ j + Y. Y^^^^A ^^^
where MLDjm = ^^yjm — ^1=^1 ^^'^Vj-mi/Ljm is the MLD index for inequality in municipality
m in country j. The first term in (3) measures between-country inequality. The second and
third terms are between-municipality (within-country) and within-municipality inequality in-
dices, respectively, weighted by country j's population share. Similarly, the Theil index can be
decomposed as
fr^ L y \ y J j^^ L y
\r^ J-iJTn yjm rp ST^ J^jm yjm , / yjm
^,
Lj yj ''" ^1 Lj y, [ y, (4)
where T,m = 73,^7 r ^''T' In ( t'^^^ ) is the Theil index for inequality in municipalitv m in
country j. These expressions show that the MLD index weights by population shares, whereas
the Theil index weights by income shares.
We begin in Table 1 by examining the ratio between the 90th and 10th percentiles of the labor
income distribution, as well as the MLD and Theil indices, for all individuals in our sample. We
decompose overall inequality in the Americas into its three component parts: inequality across
countries, inequality between municipalities/regions (within countries), and inequality within
municipalities/regions. When decomposing Western Hemisphere inequality, we consider two
population weighting schemes. The first uses actual population, whereas the second assumes
equal population in all countries, and thus reduces the influence of large countries such as
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and the United States. This latter scheme is similar in spirit to
the convention in the growth literature where different countries are given equal weight. For
comparison purposes, we decompose overall inequality separately for the eleven countries geo-
referenced to municipalities and for the six geo-feferenced to regions.^ At the bottom of the table,
we decompose inequality for all countries included in our sample. We also report cross-country
labor force rather than the size of the overall population. Unfortunately, data on labor force participation are not
readily available for much of the Americas at tiie municipality level.
''Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, and
Venezuela have data geo-referenced to the municipality. For Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and
Uruguay, the data are geo-referenced to larger regions.
inequality of 2000 GDP per worker and 2000 GDP per capita from the Penn World Tables for
all countries in the Americas for which data are available. This increases the sample size to
33 for GDP per worker and 37 for GDP per capita, primarily by adding Caribbean nations for
which we do not have labor income data. The GDP data show that the cross-country inequality
pattern in our sample is similar to that for the entire Americas, confirming that cross-country
inequality in the subset of countries we examine is similar to that in the Americas as a whole.
Appendix Table A3 provides additional documentation of inequality patterns and shows the
decomposition of between-municipality and within-municipality inequality separately for each
country.
Table 1 documents that for our entire sample, inequality in labor income across countries
is about one half to one third of the magnitude of inequality within municipalities/regions and
between two to four times as large as inequality across municipalities/regions, depending on the
precise sample and weighting scheme. For example, using the MLD index, equal population
weights and focusing on countries with municipality data, overall between-country inequality
is 0.23, while within-country inequality is 0.66, 0,11 of which is due to between-municipality
inequality. The contribution of the between-municipality component is smaller with the Theil
index, which gives greater weight to the top of the distribution, that is, to the United States
(recall that the Theil index weights by income shares whereas MLD uses population shares).
The larger magnitude of the between-country relative to the between-municipality inequality is
driven by the presence of the United States (and Canada when we include countries with data
geo-referenced to regions), which are much richer than the remaining countries in our sample.
For this reason, decompositions without these two countries might be more informative. These
are reported in the third and eighth rows. For example, the third row shows that, again focusing
on the data with municipality referencing, between-country differences are now about half of
the between-municipality differences both with the MLD and Theil indices (0.05 vs. 0.12 with
MLD and 0.05 vs. 0.11 with Theil). Appendix Table A4 shows a similar pattern when the data
are deflated using regional price indices.
One important concern with the above inequality decompositions is that measurement error
and transitory income shocks may be inflating the magnitude of within-municipality inequality.
To investigate this concern, we followed the methodology proposed by Angus Deaton and Salman
Zaidi (2002) to carefully construct, item-by-item, a comparable measure of household expendi-
ture for a number of countries in the Americas. Inequality decompositions for household expen-
diture, similar to those reported for labor income in Table 1, are presented in Appendix Table
A5. As expected given concerns about measurement error, the magnitude of within-municipality
inequality in household expenditure is less than that in labor income. Nevertheless, the over-
all comparative patterns are similar, as within country inequality in household expenditure is
substantially greater than inequality between countries.'^
'Results (available upon request) documenting educational inequality for 19 countrie.s in the Americas, 11 of
which have micro level census data, show that inequality in education attainment across municipalities in Latin
America is about twice as large as inequality in educational attainment across countries, and this pattern is
reversed when the U.S. is included.
Table 2 limits our sample to males between the ages of 18 and 55 to compare incomes across
a more homogenous population (particularly in terms of hours worked). Using this subsample,
we perform the decomposition between predicted and residual incomes. Recall that yjmi is
labor income of individual i in municipality m in country j. Let Xjmt denote a vector of
detailed education categories (in particular, zero to four years of schooling, four to eight years of
schoohng, some high school, high school graduate, and one or more years of higher education).
Let experjmi denote potential experience (defined as usual as age-schooling completed-6). We
then decompose labor income into predicted and residual components by running the following
flexible regression, which allows for a full set of interactions between education categories and a
quartic in potential experience, separately for each country j:
4
In yjmi = 22 ^jmt(ea;perjrat)''/?jfc + Sj + ejmi, (5)
where 5-j is a country-specific constant and ejmi has zero mean and country-specific variance.
Given estimates from (5), we examine inequality in overall labor income {Vjmi), inequality
in predicted labor income (exp(2^,_j Xj„jj(ea;perjmi)''/5jfc))i and inequality in residual income
(exp(Jj +ejmi))- Notice that country-specific constants, which are unrelated to difTerences in
human capital, are part of residual income.
Table 2 uses the Theil index to decompose each of the components of income (overall, pre-
dicted, and residual) into inequality between countries, inequality between municipalities/regions
(of countries), and inequality within municipalities, reporting results by country only for the six
countries with micro census data (and hence large within-municipality samples).^ Inequality in
overall labor income is similar to that reported in Table 1, where we do not restrict the sample
to prime-aged males. The decomposition shows sizable between-country predicted labor income
differences, which become much smaller when the United States is excluded. The magnitude of
between-country residual inequality is somewhat smaller (when comparing across all countries
in the sample).^ The magnitudes of between municipality inequalities in predicted and residual
labor income are similar. Table 2 also shows that the bulk of the within-municipality differences
are due to residual factors. This may reflect a greater dispersion in unobserved skills, labor
market imperfections and discrimination, measurement error, or some combination thereof.
Overall, our evidence suggests that years of schooling and the experience of the labor force
can explain a significant fraction of income disparities across and within countries, but residual
factors are also significant and generally of comparable magnitude. Although these residuals
undoubtedly include a component of unmeasured human capital differences within countries,
they also likely reflect the effects of local factors impacting productive efficiency.
''Results using the MLD index are similar and available >ipon request.
' Notice that the decomjjo.sition between predicted and residual incomes i.s not additive, since we are taking
exponential transformations of predicted and residual log incomes before the decomposition.
4 Determinants of Interregional Differences
The large differences in labor incomes and residual incomes documented in the previous section
are unlikely to be entirely due to differences in the physical capital intensity of production,
given the absence of barriers to capital mobility within countries. Instead, they likely reflect the
influence of certain local factors, the nature of which will be discussed further in this section. We
focus on determinants of cross-municipality differences. While within-municipality differences
are also clearly ineresting and important, space constraints preclude their treatment here.
One possibly relevant local characteristics is the density of economic activity across regions,
as emphasized, for example, by Ciccone and Hall (1996).'" To examine this issue, Appendix
Table A6 repeats the decomposition of predicted and residual inequality, adding a control for
municipal-level population density to equation (5).'^ The patterns when population density
is included in the predicted component of income are very similar to those in Table 2. This
exercise therefore suggests that the bulk of the between-municipality differences in income in
the Americas is not accounted for by differences in population density (or more generally, in the
density of employment, which is likely to be strongly correlated with population density). '^
Our argument is that, in the same way that technology differences play an important role in
shaping cross-national economic differences, they also likely play a major role in within-country
differentials. We now investigate why there may be significant within-country differences in
technology, broadly construed. We would ideally document the correlation between various
aspects of local institutions and incomes, but unfortunately there do not yet exist uniformly
constructed, municipality-level measures of institutions in the Americas. We instead use a
novel dataset on road infrastructure to measure the within-country inequality in proximity to
paved roads, an important form of public infrastructure, and the correlation between proximity
to roads and labor income. Local institutions affect investments in road infrastructure and
other public goods by influencing the incentives of government officials to provide public goods
(related to corruption and accountability), the capacity of the local government to raise revenues
to finance public investment (from Ideal taxes or transfers from the central government), and
the incentives and opportunities of citizens to effectively demand public goods from local and
national politicians.
'"Other factors thnt liavc been cniphasized for explaining cross-<:oinil,i'y differences include geogiajjliy and
culture. Regarding natural resources, fVancesco Caselli and Guy Michaels (2008) find that the in Brazil, discovery
of oil in a municipality increases municipal public exjienditures but has little impact on measured citizen well-
being. Melissa Dell, Benjamin F. .lones. and Benjamin A. Oiken (2009) document a .statistically significant
cross-sectional correlation between climate and income within a number of countries examined in this study using
the same economic dataset. The quantitative magnitudes they report, thotigh not trivial, suggest that climate
cannot explain the full spatial variation in the data. This leaves significant scojje for the institutional factors that
we examine.
The effects of culture (belief .systems) have also been emphasized recently (e.g.Tabellini, 2006).
"ideally we would control for employment density, but this information is not available at tlie nnmicipal level
for much of the Americas.
'^Results (available upon request) are also similar when we estimate inequality .separately for urban and rural
areas.
Table 3 documents substantial differences across municipalities in proximity to paved roads. ^"^
We calculate each municipality's proximity to intercity paved roads by overlaying a 1 km x 1
km grid on the Americas, calculating the distance (allowing for changes in elevation) from
each grid cell's centroid to the closest paved road, and then averaging this distance over all
grid cells contained within the municipality.''^ In Table 3, we conserve space by reporting the
numbers by country only for the five countries with census income data geo-referenced to the
municipality. The numbers for all countries in our sample are given in Appendix Table A7 and
the overall inequality decompositions in the final three rows of Table 3 is for this full sample
of Latin American countries and the United States. The first and second columns of Table 3
report the mean and standard deviation of municipal-level proximity to paved road networks
for Brazil, Mexico, Panama, the United States, Venezuela, and the Americas overall; column
(3) presents the 90-50 percentile ratio; and columns (4) through (7) decompose inequality in
proximity to paved roads into inequality across countries and inequality across municipalities
within countries.'^
Not surprisingly, the United States is on average the most proximate to paved roads, and
of the five countries reported in Table 3, Brazil is the least. Inequality in proximity to paved
road networks across municipalities in Latin America is about 2,5 times as large as inequality
across countries and remains higher than inequality across countries even when the United
States is included. Nevertheless, these patterns may reflect geographic factors (e.g., building
roads is both easier and more useful on the coasts than in the Amazon), and may thus be
unrelated to productivity and income differences. We undertake a preliminary investigation of
this issue in columns (8) and (9), by computing the partial correlations between proximity to
paved roads and the log of individual incomes, for males between the ages of 18 and 55 in the
five countries with census income data geo-referenced to the municipality.'^ Column (8) includes
state fixed effects. States (of which there are 27 in Brazil, 32 in Mexico, 9 in Panama, and 23
in Venezuela) are geographically small, and thus including state fixed effects ensures that we
are comparing municipalities in close geographic proximity. To further control for geographic
characteristics that may affect the density of road networks, column (9) also includes municipal
level controls for elevation, slope, and mean annual temperature and precipitation between 1950
and 2000 (see the data appendix for sources), as well as a full set of age dummies. The correlation
between distance to roads and incomes is negative and highly significant for all countries (except
Venezuela in column (9)). Translating these correlations into elasticities suggests that increasing
a municipality's average distance from paved roads by 1% reduces labor income of prime-aged
males by 0.06% in Brazil, by 0.09% in Mexico, and by 0.14% in Panama.
Naturally, these elasticities do not reflect the causal effect of proximity to roads on income.
''^R.esults (available upon reqiie.st) are similar when we con.sider both pa.ved and gra,vel roads,
'""The correlations between individual income.^ and road.s are .similar when we instead calculate road network
density, the municipality's total kilometers of paved roads divided by the surfa.ce area of the municipality,
'''Note that in contra-st to the previous tables, there is no within nnmicipality variation in road networks since
proximity is measured at the municipal level,
"'We limit the sample to prime-aged males to decrease selection on labor force participation. Results (available
upon request) are similar when all individuals with positive incomes are included in the sample.
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First, proximity to roads is likely correlated with the availability of other public goods, and we
thus interpret it as a proxy for a bundle of public goods. Second, there are several other reasons,
unrelated to the availability of public goods and local institutions, why proximity to roads may
be correlated with incomes (even after we control for observable factors). Estimating the causal
impact of roads (or local public goods more generally) on incomes is beyond the scope of this
paper. Instead, we summarize several recent studies that provide detailed empirical evidence
relating institutions to local public goods and economic prosperity within particular countries.
Melissa Dell (2008) utilizes a regression discontinuity approach to examine the long-run im-
pacts of the mita, an extensive forced mining labor system in effect in Peru and Bolivia during
the colonial era. She estimates that a mtta effect lowers household consumption today by around
one third in subjected districts. Mtta districts historically had fewer large landowners and lower
educational attainment, today they are less integrated into road networks, and their residents,
who face difficulties in transporting crops to markets due to poor road infrastructure, are sub-
stantially more likely to be subsistence farmers. Outside of Latin America, Abhijit Banerjee and
Lakshmi Iyer (2005) similarly show that colonial land revenue systems in India have long-run
effects on investments in health and education infrastructure, Daron Acemoglu et al. (2008) find
a robust association between political inequality in the 19th century in Cundinamarca, Colom-
bia (measured by the lack of turnover of mayors in the municipalities) and economic outcomes
today. They also provide evidence, consistent with Dell's (2008) findings, that the availability of
local public goods might be a particularly important intervening channel. Similar correlations
are obtained for Brazil by Joana Naritomi, Rodrigo B. Soares, and Juhano Assungao (2007).^'
Our findings are also broadly consistent with a large literature on the impact of infrastructure
on economic outcomes. In a series of studies on Peru (summarized in the Escobal and Torrero
chapter in Kanbur and Venables (2005)), Javier Escobal and co-authors empirically connect poor
local road infrastructure to higher transaction costs, lower market participation, and reduced
household income. Other studies of the effects of local public goods include, among others,
Esther Duflo and Rohini Pande (2007), which examines the effects of dams in India, and Dave
Donaldson (2008), which analyzes the impact of railroads in colonial India.
5 Towards a Framework
In this section, we provide a simple framework to interpret cross-country and cross-municipality
income differences and their dynamics, and to highlight the two-way interaction between local
and national outcomes.-'^ The framework builds on endogenous technological change models
^''AIso relevant i.s the political science literature on subnational in.stitutional variation in Latin America. Gib-
son (200.5) has developed a theoretical framework for examining "subnational authoritarianism", defined as the
persistence of authoritarian regional governments in a nationally democratic society, and has emphasized large
differences across Argentine provinces and Mexican states in the extent to which elections are fair and competi-
tive, elected local authorities are protected from arbitrary removal by regional authorities, and the judicial system
is accessible and independent. Similarly, O'Donnell (1993) has classified regions of Latin America based on the
functioning of rule of the law, documenting substantial differences within countries.
'*While the within-municipality difTerences are important, they are not our focus here.
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(e.g., Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, 1992, Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, 1991,
and Paul M. Romer, 1990) and on the model of international technological diffusion presented
in Acemoglu (2009, ch. 18). Motivated by the empirical results in Section 3 and the discussion
in Section 4, we consider a model that explicitly distinguishes countries as well as regions within
countries. In addition, we delineate productivity differentials resulting from technology, human
capital embedded in workers, and local differences in public goods and institutions. Physical
capital differences, which are the main factor emphasized by the neoclassical growth model, are
omitted from this framework.
We consider an infinite-horizon world economy in continuous time. There are J countries
indexed by j = 1, 2, ..., J, and Mj regions (municipalities) in country j indexed by m = 1, ..., Mj.
Population in each country is normalized to 1 and there is no population growth. We assume
that all countries and regions produce a single final good denoted by Y, and the aggregate
production function of region m in economy j at time t is
y,.m [t) = ^^^ / X,.„(^, ty-^dv {h,,mL,^mf , (6)1-/3 /o
where L-j^rn is labor input, which varies across regions; hj^rn is the efficiency of labor, determined
by education, public goods and other institutional factors, which can vary across regions and
countries; and 7j,m is a region-specific productivity term. While the 7j,mS could incorporate
a number of characteristics affecting regional productivity, in accordance with the empirical
evidence in Section 4, we focus on one interpreation of the 7j,mS: efficiency terms reflecting local
institutions and policies (e.g., the provision of local public goods or security of property rights).
In equation (6), the variable 7 is raised to the power /3 in order to simplify the expressions that
follow. This is without any loss of generality, since 7 has no natural scale. Our population
normalization implies that J2m=i ^j.m = 1- For now, we also ignore migration across regions.
The functional form in (6) is similar to the standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator used in en-
dogenous gi'owth models. Similarly, Nj (t) denotes the number of machine varieties available to
country j at time t. This variable captures the technological know-how of country j. Technology
diffuses slowly across countries and producers can only use the technologies available in their
country. This implies that Nj—thus the available technology—varies across countries. However,
once a country has a particular level of technology, it can be used in all regions in the country.-'^
Finally, Xj^m [v, t) is the total amount of machine variety u used in region m in country j at time
t. To simplify the analysis, let us suppose that the xs depreciate fully after use.
Each machine variety in economy j is owned by a technology monopolist, which will sell
machines embodying this technology at the profit-maximizing (rental) price Py (i^, t) in all regions
within the country. We assume that there are no regional taxes on machines or differences in
transport costs, thus machine prices will be the same across regions."" The monopolist can
'"Thus there is no slow diffusion of technology acros.s regions within a country, though differences in region-
specific productivity embedded in the 77,™ s can capture such slow diffusion.
"°Again any such differences can be incorporated into the 7j,mS.
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produce each unit of the machine at a marginal cost of i/' in terms of the final good, and without
any loss of generality, we normalize ijj =1 - (3.
We assume that each country admits a representative household with constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) preferences, with the same degree of risk aversion (intertemporal elasticity of
substitution) and the same discount rate across countries. In particular, preferences at time i =
are given by /q^" exp {-pt) (Cj {t)^~^ - l) / {I - 9) dt, with p > and ^ > 0. Although our
empirical investigation so far has emphasized income inequality, our focus here is on differences
in productivity across regions. Thus differences in the saving and consumption behavior of
households within a country are not central to our framework and the representative household
assumption enables us to suppress these. In addition, there is no international trade in goods (all
countries produce the same final good) or in assets (thus no international borrowing or lending).
This implies that the following resource constraint must hold for each country j at each time t:
- Cj{t) + X,{t) + QZ,{t)<Yjit), (7)
where Xj (t) is spending on inputs at time t and Zj [t] is expenditure on technology adoption
at time t, which may take the form of R&D or other technology expenditures. The parameter
Cj measures country-level distortions or institutional and policy differences, and will be a key
driver of potential technolog}- differences.
Technology in country j evolves as a result of the technology adoption decisions of profit-
maximizing firms. In particular, the innovation possibilities frontier takes the form
where A'' (t) is an index of the world technology frontier, rjj > for all j, and (^ > and
common to all economies. This form of the innovation possibilities frontier implies that the
technological know-how of country j advances as a result of the R&D and other technology-
related expenditures of firms in the country. The effectiveness of these investments depends on
a country-specific constant, rjj > 0, and more importantly, on how advanced the world technology
frontier is relative to country j's technological know-how (captured by the term N {t) /Nj [t)).
Each economy starts with some initial technology stock A^j (0) > and there is free entry into
research, so that any firm can invest in R&D (denoted by Zj (i)) and adopt new technologies
according to the innovation possibihties frontier (8).
Since world growth is not the focus here, suppose that the world technology frontier advances
(or frontier varieties grow) at an exogenous rate g > 0, that is,
N(t) = gN{t). (9)
Finally, we also assume that factor markets are competitive. The interest rate and the wage
rate per unit of human capital in country j are denoted, respectively, by r^ (t) and Wj [t).
An equilibrium consists of sequences of technolog>' levels, R&D levels, machine prices, interest
rates and wage rates for each country and machine demands and output levels for each region,
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such that final good firms and technology monopolists maximize profits, there is free entry into
technology adoption, and the representative household in each country maximizes its discounted
utility. A balanced growth path equilibrium (BGP) refers to an equilibrium path in which
each country grows at a constant rate. In thinking about the cross-country and cross-region
differences, comparisons of economies in BGP are a natural starting point.
It is straightforward to verify that in any equilibrium, technology monopolists, who face
iso-elastic demand curves for their machines, will set a constant markup over marginal cost
tl> = I - 0, and the equilibrium price of every machine in each country at each point in time
will be p^ {v,t) — 1. Given (6), this also implies that the demand for machines in each region of
each country that will maximize the profits of the final good producers will be
This implies the intuitive result that there will be more intensive use of technologies when
workers have greater human capital and when local conditions are more favorable for business.
Consequently, a technology monopolist (for machine variety i/) in country j will make the fol-
lowing level of profits at every point in time: ttj (u,t) = /3X^„ii Tj.m^j.m-^j.m, where P is the
difference between price and marginal cost (1 and t/' = 1 — /?), while the summation gives the
total machine sales of this monopolist, which follows from (10).
Let us start with the BGP. It is straightforward to verify that, given (8), all countries must
grow at the same rate g as given in (9). The CRRA preferences of the representative household
imply the standard Euler equation, which gives the growth rate of consumption of each country
at each point in time as C {t) /C (i) = {vj (i) — p) /d. In the BGP, output and thus consumption
in each country grow at the rate g, so the interest rates must also be constant and equal to
r* = p + 9g.
".
,.••.",;, (11)
Consequently, the value of a technology monopolist in BGP in country j is , .
V* = ^m=l 'yj,mf^j,m-L'j,Tn
'
,
Combining this expression with the innovation possibilities frontier in (8), we obtain that country
j's relative technology jij = Nj [t) /N {t) in BGP will be
with r* given by (11). In addition, it can also be proved that this BGP allocation is globally
saddle-path stable, in the sense that starting with any strictly positive vector of initial technology
levels {Nj (0)} _j, there exists a unique equilibrium path converging to this BGP.^^
'The proof of this result follows the similar derivation in Aceinoglu (2009, ch. 18).
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What does this BGP allocation imply for cross-country and cross-region inequality? The
above derivation immediately establishes that the level of income per capita in region m in
country j in the BGP is
^^-=r~^(
'^'^"'^'0^^''"'^''"'
)
(nrnh,,m) N {0) . (13)
Then, summing across regions, total income in country j in the BGP is
^^* = r^(c^j lE-^^^-^^-^^-l ^'w- (14)
These expressions give the theoretical counterparts of the regional (municipal) and national labor
incomes we computed and compared in Section 3 and can be used to develop more structural links
between our theoretical framework and between- and within-country differences. They highlight
that countries that have better possibilities for adopting world technologies (higher 77^3), where
firms face less severe barriers to adopting technologies (lower Cjs) and have on average better
local institutions (higher 7j,mS) and workers with greater human capital (higher /zj.ms) will tend
to be richer. Within a country, all regions share the same technology A'j, so it will be those
regions that have better local institutions (higher 7j,Tns) and those that have workers with higher
human capital (higher /ij.ms) that will be richer. This framework also emphasizes the two-waj'
interaction between national and local factors. First, two regions (j, m) and [j\m') that have
identical characteristics but are situated in different countries will have different income levels,
because they will have access to different country-level technologies. Second, a country with a
number of regions with low 7j,mS and /ij,mS will generate a lower demand for machines embodying
new technologies (as shown by equation (10)), and this will reduce the profitability of adopting
technologies from the world frontier at the national level and will tend to reduce national income.
This channel also suggests that if within-country inequalities are caused by the failure of some
regions to offer good business conditions, public goods and a workforce with the requisite skills,
then this will tend reduce income in the country both directly (because some regions are poorer)
and indirectl}' (because technology adoption at the national level becomes less profitable). ~-
The framework presented above does not allow for migration across municipalities. A natural
question is whether migration would affect cross-municipality differences in income and output.
One may conjecture that differences due to local institutions and policies (the 7s in the model)
would be arbitraged away when migration is possible. This is not necessarily the case, however,
as a variety of factors make movement across municipalities costly. First, in parts of Latin
"The magnitude of the indirect channel in practice will depend on the extent to which firms produce for the
domestic market. Openness, defined as imports plus export as a share of GDP (Heston et al., 2006) ranges
considerably across the countries we consider in our empirical analysis, from around 20% in Argentina, 2.5% in
Brazil and the United States, and 40% in Boliiva. Colombia and Venzuela to around two thirds in Mexico, Chile,
and El Salvador.
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America, there are explicit barriers to migration."'^ Second and more importantly, migration
will arbitrage all differences due to the 7s only when there are no difTerences in the costs of
living and housing across municipalities. In practice, both housing costs and the prices of other
goods and services differ significantly across regions.
Recognizing that migration, even if it could take place without any impediments, would
not lead to an equalization of non-human capital incomes (when not deflated fully) implies that
regional differences will have two components; those due to human capital differences (and other
factors mobile with workers) and those due to differences in local conditions. These correspond
to the influences of the hs and 7s in the model. We can then map the differences due to the hs to
those related to education and the differences due to the 7s to the residual differences obtained
in Section 3 after we removed the influence of education and experience. In particular, our
decomposition suggests that the cross-municipality variation accounted for by these two sources
are broadly similar.
6 Concluding Remarks
This study used a novel data set of labor incomes to document within-country (cross-
municipality) income differences for a large number of countries in the Americas. Within Latin
America, between-municipahty differences in incomes are greater than cross-country differences.
We documented that about half of the between-country and between-municipality differences
can be accounted for by differences in human capital, the remainder being due to residual
factors. We also proposed a simple unified framework for the analysis of cross-country and
within-country income differences, which emphasizes the importance of the efficiency of pro-
duction. Productive efficiency is determined at the country level by the technology adoption
decisions of profit-maximizing firms and by national institutions, and within countries by local
institutions, such as the availability of local public goods and the security of property rights.
Future research could follow a number of promising paths for identifying the underlying
determinants of local productivity differences. The empirical and qualitative evidence suggests
that differences in local public goods—determined in part by institutions at the local and regional
level—are one source of within-country differences. Such patterns call for more systematic
measurement and empirical investigation of specific institutional features at the subnational
level, as well as new theoretical work modeling the impact and endogenous determination of
these local forces.
^^ Notably, in regions where a .substantial portion of the land is held b)' indigenous communities, there are
legal and traditional impediments to selling land to outsiders, making larger cities, which often have significant
dis-amenities, the main viable destinations for migration.
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A. Online Appendices—Not for Publication
Al. Decomposing Inequality Measures
In this section, we derive the decompositions of the general entropy indices used in the main
text of this paper: the Mean Log Deviation (MLD) index and the Theil index.
The mean log deviation index for total inequality in country j is given by: " .
MLDj =lnj/j - — ^ ^Iny^™, (A-1)
^ m— 1 1=1
where yjmi is the income of individual i in municipality m in country j, y^ is mean national
income and Lj is total national population in country j.
Now adding and subtracting Ylrn=i ~i~' ^''^yjm to both sides (where y^rn is mean income in
municipality m and L-jrn is the number of individuals in municipality m), we obtain:
/ ""' L- \ ""' L-
MLD, = Iny, - J^ -^ In j/,,„ + J^ -^MLD.m.
\ m=\ ^ j m=l -^
where
MLDjm = InVjm - J—^ In yjmi
is the MLD index for inequality in municipality m in country j. The first term is the MLD
measure of cross-municipality inequality, and the second term is a weighted average of the
MLDs within each municipality, where the weights are municipality population shares,
Now let us repeat the same exercise for decomposing the MLD index into inequality between
versus within countries. The Western Hemisphere MLD index is then:
MLZ? = In 2/ --^ 2 ^ In y^mi,
J= l 771=1 t=l
where yjmi is the income of individual i in municipality m in country j, y is mean income in the
Western Hemisphere, and L is total population in the Western Hemisphere,
Now add and subtract ^^^j -^lnj/_,, where y, is mean income in country j and Lj is the
number of individuals in country j. Again, basic algebra yields:
/here
MLD
J
= Inyj - y- X^ ^Int/,,Lj
' m=l 1=1
is the MLD index for inequality in country j.
n
Plugging in from our decomposition of MLDj above yields:
MLD =hny-J2^\nyA+J2j;^
3=1 J J=l m=\ ' / 771= 1 -^
where, from above, MLDjrn = In J/jm — 77— YLi^ In yjmi is the MLD index for inequality in
municipality m in country j. The first term gives between country inequality, and the second
and third terms are between municipality (within country) and within-municipality inequality,
respectively, weighted by country j's population share.
A similar exercise can be used to decompose the Theil index for country j, given by:
r, - V V|^ln(^^), (A-2^
where y^rni, Vj and Lj are defined as above. Again, adding and subtracting Ylim=\ 'ir'^^ Iny^,
both sides, we obtain
M
rp
__
ST^ ^jm yjm rp
'
'
^, Lj yj '^m=l ' '
^ ^jm Vj-m , I VjT
\ Lj yj
In
V]
where
Tjm — 7 ,
yjrm ,
I
yjr
_, ^jmyjm \ yjm
is the Theil index for inequality in municipahty m in country j.
Now we decompose the Theil index for overall Western Hemisphere inequality, given by:
(A-3)
j = l m = l 1= 1 "
yjr
y
where yjmi is the income of individual i in municipality m in country j, y is mean income in
the Western Hemisphere, and A'^ is the total population in the Western Hemisphere. W'ith the
same steps as before, we can also write
^-E^^^. +E
j=i ^ j=iL y
^ ^Ly\y
where
Mj Ljm
^.=y:y.
yjr In yjr
is the Theil index for inequality in country j. Note that this is equal to (A-2). Plugging in the
decomposition from above yields:
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Ljyj /Inyj
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L y \ y
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where again T,m = ^^,-7 r ^'Z' In I ^f^^ ) is the Theil index for inequality in municipaUty m
in country j. The first component is cross-country inequality, the second component is between
municipality inequality, and the third component is within-municipality inequality.
A2. Data Methodology
We discussed the construction of our nationally (but not regionally) deflated labor income data
in the text, so here our main focus is on the methodology used to create our household expen-
diture aggregate (examined in Appendix Table A5). We construct our measure of household
expenditure by aggregating expenditures on food and non-food items, durable goods, and hous-
ing. Marriages, births, and funerals, which are lumpy and relatively infrequent expenditures,
are excluded. We include expenditures on health, but patterns of household expenditure are
very similar when these are instead excluded. Gifts and transfers made by the household are
not included, as these will be counted as they are spent by their recipients.
The method we use to calculate the flow expenditure on durable goods varies according to the
data available in each household survey. Household surveys for Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru include the current value and age of durable
goods held by each household. Following the recommendations of Deaton and Zaidi (2002), we
calculate the average age for each durable good t using data on the purchase dates of the good
recorded in the survey. Then, we estimate the average lifetime of each good as 2i, under the
assumption that purchases are uniformly distributed through time. The remaining life of each
good is then calculated as 2t — t, where t is the current age of the good. A rough estimate of
the flow of services is derived by dividing the current value by the good's expected remaining
life. The interest component in the flow of services is ignored.
In contrast, the household survey for Brazil includes a list of durable goods held by the
household and their ages, but does not contain estimates of their current values. We estimate
the purchase value of the good as the state median price for that good using data on purchase
values from the expenditure section of the survey. Then we calculate the average life of the
good as 2t. To complete the estimate, we calculate the average user cost of the good as the
median purchase value divided by the average lifetime of the good. Finally, some household
surveys (Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, and Uruguay) do not include any
information about the stock of durables held by households. In these cases, we calculate the
durables sub-aggregate as expenditures by the household in the previous year on durable goods.
Some surveys ask multiple questions on the same expenditures with different reference
periods—i.e., ''the last two weeks" versus a "typical month". Following recommendations by
Deaton and Zaidi, we use the latter. We calculate both per capita household expenditure and
expenditure per equivalent adult (in local prices, national prices, and 2005 international $). Fol-
lowing Deaton (1997), we assume that children aged to 4 are equal to 0.4 adults, and children
aged 5 to 14 are equal to 0.5 adults.
Adjusting for differences in purchasing power is important for making regional and interna-
tional comparisons of household welfare using expenditure data. Consider a Paasche price index
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comparing the price vector faced by the household, ph, and the reference price vector, po-
where g'' is the consumption vector and p'' q^ denotes the inner product of these two vectors.
Rearranging yields:
P P
where the value of the household's consumption defined at reference prices, y^ = p° q^, is
our object of interest and x/i is household expenditure. Note the convenient link with national
income accounting practice, in which real national product is the lefthand side of (A-5) summed
over all households.
To calculate y^ from our expenditure data, we rewrite (A-4) as:
Pp = ^ (A-6)
where tt.'^ is the share of household h's budget devoted to good k and pjj (and p°) denotes the
/cth component of the corresponding vector. P^ involves not only the prices faced by house-
hold h in relation to the reference prices, but also household /I's expenditure pattern. Using
a Paasche price index with household specific weights allows us to account for differences in
expenditure patterns
—
prevalent across regions—when adjusting prices. We calculate P^ from
the information about food quantities and expenditures available in our household surveys. We
take the reference vector po to be the median of prices observed from individual households in
the survey.To reduce the influence of outliers, we replace the individual p^ by their medians over
households in the same municipahty.
Calculating prices from our survey data requires converting all quantities (i.e., pieces, bottles,
bundles) to constant units (kilograms or hters) for each commodity, and then dividing total
expenditure by quantity purchased. In some cases, national statistics offices performed these
calculations before releasing the data. In other cases, the survey documentation contains the
necessary conversion factors—by commodity—to convert to constant units. In a couple of cases
(most notably, Bolivia), surveys report some quantities in "pieces" but do not provide conversion
factors. In these instances, we use the conversion factors for similar goods provided by other
surveys.
Constructing a meaningful consumption aggregate also required checking the survey data
for obvious data entry errors and irregularities, most common in reporting food quantities. In
some—but not all—surveys, national statistical offices did a thorough job of error checking. After
carefully examining individual data points, we used the following procedure to correct data that
were clearly recorded incorrectly. If the household's annual expenditure on a good was more
than four standard deviations above the mean expenditure on that good in the household's
municipality (or state if the municipality is not identified or had very few observations), the
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observation was replaced by the municipality median. Less than 1% of the sample meets this
cutoff. The procedure is used for all surveys in our dataset. The distribution of aggregate
consumption is robust to instead dropping these items, or requiring the value to be more than
five standard deviations above the municipality mean. Results are also robust to using deviations
in logs rather than levels. We apply a similar procedure in calculating prices for the Paasche
index, dropping quantities that are more than four standard deviations from the municipality
mean.
After deflating regional prices to national prices, we further adjust for differences in inter-
national purchasing power by normalizing the data so that household expenditure within each
country aggregates to 2005 national per capita consumption in international dollars from the
World Development Indicators. . ' ' '
Income data are drawn from either population censuses or household surveys. The census
data give a single measure of labor income, whereas labor income from household surveys is
constructed from responses to various questions about earned income (i.e. from primary occu-
pation, secondary occupation, etc.) The methodology we use to construct the income aggregate
is similar to that used to construct the consumption aggregate. We compare per capita income
from the census or household survey with the value of PPP adjusted GDP per worker in 2003,
taken from the Penn World Tables. This allows us to calculate a factor to adjust income so that
it averages to GDP per worker in constant international dollars. To produce the decompositions
in Appendix Table A2, we also deflate by the state median of the household specific Paasche
index discussed above. When a Paasche index is unavailable, we use data on regional purchasing
power pro\'ided by National Statistics Offices.
The climate and geography variables were constructed as follows. Municipal-level temper-
ature and precipitation variables were calculated using 30 arc second resolution (1 kilometer)
mean temperature and precipitation over the 1950-2000 period, as compiled by climatologists
at U.C. Berkeley (Hijmans, Robert et al, 2005). We also use 30 arc second resolution terrain
data (NASA and NGIA, 2000), collected by the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission, to construct
municipal-level mean elevation and slope. The GIS municipality boundaries were produced by
the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT, 2008b).
A3. Further Results
Table Al lists the data sources used in this paper, and Table A2 provides summar)' statis-
tics. Table A3 examines labor income inequality, where labor incomes are not deflated for
regional purchasing power. The overall decompositions of inequality into cross-country, cross-
municipality, and within-municipality inequality are thus identical to those presented in Table 1
of the main text, with Table A3 presenting the inequality measures, country-by-country, for the
full set of countries for which we have data. Table A3 shows that the extent of inequality across
countries depends on the measure being used, though Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela are among
the most unequal countries with all three measures. Table A4 examines labor income inequality
where incomes have been deflated by the state level median of the Paasche price index described
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above. The results are very similar to those shown in Tables 1 and A3.
Table A5 examines inequality in equivalent household expenditure, constructed according
to the methodology described above. Not surprisingly, the extent of inequality in household
expenditure is less than that in labor income. Nevertheless, the overall comparative patterns
are similar. In particular, the within-country MLD and Theil indices are substantially greater
than the between country ones.^"^ The ranking of countries in terms of inequality in Table A5 is
sometimes quite different than that in Table A3. For example, Peru appears to have relatively
less within-municipality inequality. This likely reflects differences in the variability of monthly
labor income relative to household expenditure and in the precise nature and quality of the
various household questionnaires.'^^
Table A6 investigates the implications of controlling for population density (as a proxy for
the density of economic activity). It uses the Theil index to decompose each of the components
of income (overall, predicted, and residual) into inequality between countries, inequality be-
tween municipalities/regions (of countries), and inequality within municipalities, where income
is predicted using information on individual education, predicted individual experience, and mu-
nicipal level population density. Table A7 presents the inequality decompositions for proximity
to paved roads country-by-country. Note that when considering proximity to paved roads, we
have municipal level data for all countries presented."^
Finally, Figures Al through A3 provide maps showing mean (non-deflated) labor income by
municipality (or region) for North America, Mexico and Central America, and South America,
respectively.^^ Note the difference in scale between the North America map and the Latin
America maps.
"^Note that because of tlie .small sample sizes of existing ronsumption data.sets for the United States and
Canada, these countries are not included in the consumption inequality decompositions. Hence, the overall
inequality numbers in Table A5 should be compared to those witliout tiie United States and Canada in Table 1.
''For example, the Peruvian consumption data provides somewhat larger samples than most of the other
consumption data sets and contains many carefully detailed questions on expenditure and home production. To
the extent that it is one of the highest quality data sets, it may have little measurement error in the within-
municipality inequality component, relative to the within components from the other expenditure and income
data sets.
Canada is omitted because its administrative division involves extremely large swathes of territory grouped
into single administrative units. This absence of municipality level data make it difficult to compare the decom-
positions for Canada to those for the rest of the Americas.
'Particularly for the countries where data are drawn from household surveys, labor income is not available for
every mimicipality. In order to provide an approximate overall pict\ire of spatial patterns in income, we replace
mi.ssiug municipality values by the median labor income in the municipality's first administrative unit (i.e. state
or department).
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Table A2: Summary Statistics
Income per Work:er
No. Males No. Mean Mun./ R,ef. to Country
Obs. 18-50 Mun./Reg. Reg. Pop. Munic. Pop.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bolivia 8,166 4,227 106 108,897 yes 8,152,620
Brazil 3,481,697 1,920,149 1,519 94,823 yes 175.552,771
Canada 441,740 196,208 11 2,695,307 no 30,689,040
Chile 14,879 6,952 2 7,551,517 no 15,153,797
Colombia 18,479 8.270 9 4.665,758 no 39,685,055
Costa Rica 5,699 6 no 3,710,558
Ecuador 22,275 10,581 20 628,822 no 12,920,092
El Salvador 22,937 10.796 64 64906.51 yes 6,122,515
Guatemala 11,440 5,707 226 41,901 yes 12,820,296
Hondm-as 13,160 5,978 98 44,973 yes 6.200,898
Mexico 2,660,016 1,562,092 2,442 41,390 yes 100,087.900
Panama 94,645 55053 30 40,776 yes 2,836,298
Paraguay 6,867 3,441 175 26,820 yes 5,585,828
Peru 22,207 11.333 610 30.619 yes 27.012,899
United States 7,401,156 3,272,003 2,071 126,211 yes 284,153,700
Uruguay 8,082 3,707 19 141,812 no 3.334,074
Venezuela 677,524 380,797 219 110,118 yes 23,542,649
Total 14.910,969 7,457,300 7,627 799,871,887
See Appendix Table Al for variable sources.
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Table A7: Proximity to Paved Roads
Mean SD
Dist. to Dist. to 90/50
Road Road Ratio
MLD Index
Between Within
Country Country
Theil Index
Between Within
Country Country
No U.S. (equal)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Argentina 8.5 9.7 3.2
Bolivia 73.5 83.0 6.3
Brazil 29.3 64.1 7.9
Chile 25.1 21.1 4.1
Colombia 19.3 31.7 3.7
Costa Rica 5,7 6.0 4.0
Ecuador 23.8 35.7 9.8
El Salvador 4.3 2.4 1.9
Guatemala 13.3 24.3 6.8
Honduras 11.6 18.0 3.7
Mexico 9.5 9.9 3.2
Nicaragua 21.8 38.3 8.6
Panama 12.4 23.2 3.0
Paraguay 34.7 49.6 6.0
Peru 19.5 33.9 9.1
United States 1.5 3.3 3.4
Uruguay 10.7 10.6 4.5
Venezuela 11.1 26.2 2.7
All (actual) 13.2 36.5 6.4
All (equal) 18.6 37.8 5.8
19.7 38.6 .6 0.240
0.436
0.609
0.956
0.353
0.692
0.622
0.641
0.147
0.824
0.418
0.382
0.915
0.643
1.001
1.180
0.914
0.478
0.508
0.634 0.249
(7)
0.413
0.513
1.049
0.306
0.681
0.470
0.703
0.139
0.860
0.535
0.379
0.886
0.756
0.752
0.889
0.795
0.416
0.747
0.621 0.774 0.439 0.815
0.311 0.649 0.286 0.656
0.655
See Appendix Table Al and the text for source.s. Column (3) pr&sents the ratio of the 9()th percentile of the proximity
to paved roads distribution to the .50th percentile. Columns (4) through (7) decompose inequality, using the Mean Log
Deviation index and the Theil index, respectively. "Actual" refers to weighting by actual popnjUvtion, whereas "equal"
normalizes each country's population to be of equal size. The final row omits the United States from the sample.
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Figure A3: Labor incomes in South America
Mean Labor Income (PPP $)
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